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Abstract
This article introduces the topic “Production of Referring Expressions:
Bridging the Gap between Computational and Empirical Approaches to Ref-
erence” of the journal Topics in Cognitive Science. We argue that compu-
tational and psycholinguistic approaches to reference production can benefit
from closer interaction, and that this is likely to result in the construction of
algorithms that differ markedly from the ones currently known in the com-
putational literature. We focus particularly on determinism, the feature of
existing algorithms that is perhaps most clearly at odds with psycholinguis-
tic results, discussing how future algorithms might include non-determinism,
and how new psycholinguistic experiments could inform the development of
such algorithms.
Keywords: Referring Expressions, Computational models, Psycholinguistic experiments,
Non-determinism in language production, Overspecification
COMPUTATIONAL PSYCHOLINGUISTICS OF REFERENCE PRODUCTION 3
Introduction
Throughout the last century, reference has been studied in all academic disciplines that
study language and communication, varying from theoretical linguistics and philosophy
to language acquisition, psycholinguistics and computational linguistics. This is not
surprising, given the centrality of reference in human communication: people can only
exchange information about an object if they agree about the identity of the object
first. Thus, when children acquire language, one of the first things they learn is how to
refer to objects (Bruner, 1983; D. E. Matthews, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2007), and when
computers produce language, the generation of referring expressions is, invariably, one of
the key tasks they perform (Reiter & Dale, 2000). The philosopher John Searle defined
reference as follows:
Any expression which serves to identify any thing, process, event, action, or
any other kind of individual or particular I shall call a referring expression.
Referring expressions point to particular things; they answer the questions
Who?, What?, Which? (Searle, 1969, p. 26-7)
Searle acknowledged that this definition is imprecise (e.g., if you sign your name, do you
refer to yourself?), but suggests that the proper approach is “to examine those cases
which constitute the center of variation of the concept of referring and then examine
the borderline cases in light of their similarities and differences from the paradigms”.
The current issue of the journal Topics in Cognitive Science, to which the present article
serves as an introduction, is consistent with Searle’s methodological remarks. More
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specifically, it uses definite descriptions (i.e., noun phrases of the form “the . . . ”) as its
paradigm of reference, while including other expressions – such as pronouns and proper
names – to the extent that they function in the same way.
In this article, we shall examine some of the main results and methods of two
of the most prolific research traditions to study reference, namely psycholinguistics and
computational linguistics, focussing on the production of referring expressions. Research
in these two traditions has so far proceeded with little mutual influence. Psycholin-
guistic work on reference production seldom references computational work; although it
has given rise to interesting ideas (e.g., concerning common ground and alignment), the
resulting models are in many ways still sketchy and imprecise, as we shall see. Com-
putational work on reference production occasionally mentions psycholinguistic studies;
moreover, algorithms in this area have recently come to be tested using methods that
owe much to the psycholinguistic tradition. However, while the resulting algorithms
are useful for practical applications, they are unsatisfactory as models of linguistic be-
haviour, as we shall argue. This article aims to bridge the gap between computational
and psycholinguistic approaches to reference production, arguing that each discipline
can benefit substantially by taken the some of the insights and methods of the other
tradition on board. The substance of our argument will focus on the related issues of
referential overspecification and nondeterminism. Before we get there, we shall sketch
briefly how reference production has been studied in each of the two research traditions.
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Computational approaches to reference production
The computational production of referring expressions is a key component of many
Natural Language Generation (nlg) systems (Reiter & Dale, 2000; Mellish et al., 2006).
Work on algorithms for Referring Expression Generation (reg) started when computer
programs such as shrdlu (Winograd, 1972) needed an ability to identify objects to
human users, for example to answer their questions (e.g., User: “Which block supports
the table?” System: “The red pyramid.”) Research on reg started in earnest in the
1980s, focussing on the underlying intentions that an agent had in producing referring
expressions (Appelt, 1985; Kronfeld, 1990). Inspired by the work of Searle, Austin and
others, Appelt and Kronfeld argued that a referring expression should be seen as part
of a larger speech act. In their approach, the generation of a referring expression was
part of planning and generating an entire utterance. More recent work has focused on
the generation of definite, identifying noun phrases, as a separate nlg task (Dale, 1989;
Dale & Reiter, 1995). Since the work of Dale and Reiter, a significant consensus has
arisen on the nature of the problem that these reg algorithms are designed to solve,
with many approaches subscribing to some version of the following task definition, which
emphasises content determination and unambiguous identification.
Given a domain of discourse, consisting of entities and their properties, and
a target referent, find a set of properties (the description) which uniquely
distinguishes the target referent from its distractors.
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The above definition does not specify how the current domain of discourse is to be
determined It also does not tackle other communicative intentions that could underlie
the production of a definite reference, beyond identification (pace Jordan, 2002; Jordan
& Walker, 2005). Reference, in this tradition, is most often understood as a “one-shot”
affair, where the referring expression in question cannot rely on information in previous
utterances. Exceptions exist, where reg work has started to address the generation of
anaphoric referential nps (see Passonneau, 1996; McCoy & Strube, 1999; Krahmer &
Theune, 2002; Callaway & Lester, 2002; Stoia, Shockley, Byron, & Fosler-Lussier, 2006,
among others). Heeman and Hirst (1995) went further, by proposing a computational
model which addresses the types of collaboration observed in dialogue by Clark and
Wilkes-Gibbs (1986). Heeman and Hirst’s work is rooted in a long tradition in Artificial
Intelligence, which seeks to understand dialogue using models of rational agency based
on communicative intentions and mutually held beliefs (e.g., Allen & Perrault, 1980;
Cohen & Levesque, 1991).
Insert Table 1 and Box 1 about here.
An important theoretical influence on many reg algorithms has been the work
of Grice (1975), whose Maxim of Quantity was originally interpreted in the context of
referring expressions as a constraint to include no more information than is required
for a distinguishing description (e.g., Appelt, 1985; Dale, 1989). This Full Brevity in-
terpretation was compatible with early psycholinguistic theorising (e.g., Olson, 1970).
Given a domain such as Table 1, a Full Brevity algorithm would yield the minimally
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distinguishing description {large} for e1 (this description could be realised as the large
one). Dale and Reiter’s (1995) later Incremental Algorithm (ia), which had roots in the
work of Winograd and Appelt, relaxed this constraint. The ia, summarised in Box 1,
is based on the finding that some properties of a referent (e.g., its colour) are more
likely to be included in a description than others, even when this leads to overspecified
referring expressions, which are longer than necessary for identification (e.g., Pechmann,
1989). In the ia, the likelihood of selection is determined by a fixed preference order of
properties, with more preferred properties being more likely to be selected. Overspeci-
fication occurs because the algorithm never withdraws properties once they have been
selected. The ia is still an influential reg model, which has informed many subsequent
developments (see Krahmer & van Deemter, 2011, for a review). Various papers in the
present journal issue build on this algorithm directly, for example by investigating how
the fixed preference order of the ia interacts with other factors, such as alignment with
a property used in the previous utterance (Goudbeek & Krahmer, 2012), or in what
way normally preferred properties, such as colour, can loose their preferential status in
settings where they prove to have low utility or when, because of a craftily constructed
experiment, the hearer cannot be relied upon to see the same colours (Guhe, 2012).
Many reg algorithms rely on the implicit assumption that generated references
should be humanlike. This ‘goal’ of emulating human behaviour is particularly evident
in the way such algorithms are typically evaluated. As in many other areas of nlp,
a typical reg evaluation scenario involves the comparison of automatically generated
referring expressions to a set of human-produced ‘reference’ outputs in a corpus (Gupta
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& Stent, 2005; Jordan & Walker, 2005; Viethen & Dale, 2007; van Deemter, Gatt, van
der Sluis, & Power, to appear). Such evaluations usually incorporate a metric which
yields a global score reflecting the degree of match between an algorithm and one or
more individual participants. Averaged over an entire corpus, such metrics typically
ignore the variation within the corpus and the extent to which an algorithm ‘agrees’
with a subset of the participants represented in the corpus.
Humanlikeness, of course, is not the only conceivable goal for a reg algorithm.
An alternative is to aim for effectiveness, by generating descriptions that are easy for a
comprehender to understand and/or resolve (e.g., Paraboni, van Deemter, & Masthoff,
2007), and such a comprehension-oriented perspective is of great importance in practical
applications. The two goals of humanlikeness and effectiveness are not necessarily com-
patible, since human speakers do not always produce optimal expressions (Oberlander,
1998; Dale & Viethen, 2010; Gatt & Belz, 2010). We shall return to this issue at the
end of the next section.
Psycholinguistic approaches to reference production
Production has been studied extensively by psycholinguists as well. In this section,
we focus on two areas which are of particular relevance not only to psycholinguistic but
also to computational models, namely overspecification and ambiguity avoidance and
interaction and audience design.
Computational algorithms have sometimes been inspired by psycholinguistic work.
An example is Dale and Reiter’s reliance on the work of Pechmann (1989) (see also Levelt,
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1989) in connection with the observation that human speakers sometimes overspecify
their references, and hence so should reg algorithms. The theme of overspecification has
again arisen in more recent debates concerning the question whether and how speakers
ensure that their referring expressions are maximally interpretable to the addressee.
It has become clear, for example, that in some situations, speakers tend to produce
ambiguous or underspecified referring expressions. For example, Ferreira, Slevc and
Rogers (2005) found that speakers will use the expression the bat (for a flying mammal)
even when a baseball bat is also present, making the description ambiguous. Khan and
colleagues observed that syntactic ambiguities (as in “the old men and women”, whose
syntax leaves it unclear whether it denotes all women or just the old ones) are frequent as
well, and proceeded to investigate the conditions under which such surface-ambiguities
are resolvable by the hearer (Khan, van Deemter, & Ritchie, 2012).
Overspecification appears to occur more frequently, though. Recent studies have
suggested that redundant information is frequent in the referring expressions produced
by people (e.g., Arts, 2004; P. E. Engelhardt, Bailey, & Ferreira, 2006). This is consistent
with the Incremental Algorithm, which predicts overspecification in specific situations.
In fact, the ia makes some precise predictions concerning overspecification: assuming
that colour is preferred over size (Box 1), then a generated description can include
colour as an overspecified property, but not size (after all, if colour were sufficient to
distinguish a target, the ia would select colour and then terminate, so it would not
consider less preferred properties). This is an interesting prediction that has never been
tested experimentally, as far as we know.
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Many factors are known to affect speakers’ tendency to overspecify. It has been
shown, for example, that speakers overspecifiy more frequently in fault-critical situations,
i.e., where confusion would tend to cause problems (Arts, 2004; Arts, Maes, Noordman,
& Jansen, 2011). Paraboni, van Deemter and Masthoff (2007) showed how speakers
use overspecification to identify objects in large domains, and how readers benefit: If
there is only one photocopier in a building, located on a different floor, then simply
directing a new member of staff to the photocopier would be unhelpful; the photocopier,
on the 2dn floor, opposite the elevator is much better. Koolen, Gatt, Goudbeek and
Krahmer (2011) found that speakers overspecify more often when referring to ‘complex’
targets, for example, when referring to persons rather than furniture items and when
referring to plural rather than singular targets. All these results suggest that there
may not be a single reason why speakers overspecify their references. Be that as it
may, overspecification has to be used with caution: Engelhardt and colleagues (2006),
for example, found that although listeners do not rate overspecified references as worse
than minimal ones, eye-tracking data suggests that overspecified descriptions (Put the
apple on the towel in the box where the apple would suffice) can be confusing for listeners
when they cause syntactic ambiguity. More recently, Engelhardt et al. (2011) presented
evidence that even overspecification with properties such as colour, which is realised
prenominally and does not give rise to syntactic ambiguity in the NP, result in hearers
taking longer to resolve references in visual domains (P. Engelhardt, Demiral, & Ferreira,
in press).
The avoidance of misunderstandings is, of course, highly relevant for determin-
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ing whether a target should be referred to using a full description or a reduced form.
A pronoun provides less information about its antecedent than a full description does,
so pronouns are predicted to be used when their antecedents are highly salient. Vari-
ous proposals have been put forward, linking the form of a referring expression to the
saliency of the referent in the discourse (see e.g., Ariel, 2001; Arnold, 2001; Givon, 1983;
Stevenson, Crawley, & Kleinman, 1994). Recently, Arnold and Griffin (2007) showed
that speakers produced fewer pronouns (and more names) when an additional character
was present in the discourse than when it was not, suggesting that the presence of the
additional character competes with, and therefore, reduces the saliency of the target
referent. Fukumura, van Gompel, and Pickering (2010) showed that the presence or
absence of an additional character in the visual context has a similar effect, supporting
the idea that not only saliency in the discourse, but also saliency in the visual context
affects the choice of referring expression.
A large body of work now shows the limitations of viewing reference as a “one-shot”
affair. Clark and colleagues (Clark & Murphy, 1983; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Bren-
nan & Clark, 1996), for example, have shown that references change during the course of
an interaction, becoming more reduced and eventually converging on a single description
for a referent. They interpret these findings in terms of a collaborative process, whereby
speaker and addressee both converge on a descriptive form for a referent (referred to as
a ‘conceptual pact’ by Brennan & Clark, 1996). A more general account of adaptation
in dialogue is the Interactive Alignment Model of Pickering and Garrod (2004), which
claims that dialogue participants may align their linguistic representations at all levels
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of interaction, ranging from alignment of phonological and phonetic categories (Bard &
Aylett, 2004) up to lexical and syntactic choice. Many authors see alignment as the
result of a mechanistic, largely automatic process where speakers produce expressions
that are easy to comprehend for their addressee because they rely on representations that
were used (“primed”) earlier on in the interaction. We do not know of any attempts
to model the priming mechanisms outlined by Pickering and Garrod in computational
reg, though they may be discerned in other subtasks of Natural Language Generation
(e.g., Purver & Kempson, 2004; Buschmeier, Bergmann, & Kopp, 2010).
While the importance of adaptation and audience design is not disputed, the
extent to which speakers are capable of taking the addressee into account is a matter
of intensive debate, with some researchers arguing that speakers in fact find it hard
to do this, for example when some subset of a referential domain is in a speaker’s
privileged ground, rather than in common ground (Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar,
Lin, & Barr, 2003; Wardlow Lane, Groisman, & Ferreira, 2006). These authors would
argue that speakers frequently plan their utterances “egocentrically”. This conclusion
has sometimes been questioned (Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Brennan & Hanna, 2009). Heller
and colleagues add to these questions by re-examining the data of an earlier study by
Wu and Keysar Heller, Skovbroten, and Tanenhaus; Wu and Keysar. When subjects
in a new experiment were given the utterances from the earlier study to listen to, they
were generally able to determine whether a given item of information was privileged or
not. In other words, where Wu and Keysar had found expressions (e.g., names) that
they regarded as egocentric, these expressions may actually have been produced for good
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reasons (e.g. to “teach” the hearer the name). We assume that the last words on this
debate have not yet been said.
Towards a computational psycholinguistic theory of reference
The previous two sections have illustrated how computational and psycholinguistic
research on the production of referring expressions are often seen as separate areas, with
only limited interaction between them. Yet, each of the two areas suffers from limitations
which the other would be well placed to rectify. Clearly, as we have seen, there are various
aspects of referential behaviour which current reg algorithms ignore, but which have
received a lot of attention among psycholinguists. Conversely, psycholinguistic theories
often rely on intuitive notions such as ‘common ground’, ‘adaptation’, ‘alignment’, or
‘salience’, without defining these precisely. A study by Poesio, Stevenson, Eugenio,
and Hitzeman (2004) shows how a computational approach can be useful in such cases.
In discussing the Centering model of discourse anaphora (Grosz, Joshi, & Weinstein,
1995), these authors demonstrated the extent to which the underlying assumptions of
psycholinguistic models need to be explicated. Psycholinguistic experimentation (e.g.,
Brennan, 1995; Gordon & Hendrick, 1999; Gordon, Kendrick, Ledoux, & Yang, 1999)
has suggested that the preference for a pronoun over a name in both production and
comprehension is affected by factors such as the salience of the antecedent and in which
utterance it occurred. However, the notions of ‘salience’ and ‘utterance’ have remained
vague. This has given rise to several “parameters” in the Centering model. Poesio and
colleagues argued that while “the best way to test such preferences is through behavioral
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experiments”, this is in practice difficult because of “the enormous number of possible
ways of setting the theory’s parameters” (Poesio et al., 2004, p. 310). They therefore
set about testing several of these alternative parameter settings computationally, using
an annotated corpus to test different versions of the theory, and explicitly formalising
several hitherto underspecified parameters in the process.
Even though there is undoubted scope for increased collaboration between practi-
tioners in the psycholinguistic and computational camps, we shall see that this requires
a re-evaluation of the goals that reg algorithms are designed to achieve, as well as a
different focus in psycholinguistic studies.
Goals of computational algorithms and their relevance for psycholinguistics
As we have seen, the exact goal of reg algorithms, as these are presented in the
literature, is often unclear. Dale and Reiter’s (1995) Incremental Algorithm is a good
example. On the one hand, the authors argued that one way of creating computational
models is to “determine how speakers generate texts, and build an algorithm based on
these observations (the Incremental Algorithm Interpretation)” (Dale & Reiter, 1995,
p. 252) and, consequently, their Incremental Algorithm is often understood as aiming
to produce referring expressions that resemble those that speakers produce. Yet they
state: “The argument can be made that psychological realism is not the most important
consideration for developing algorithms for embodiment in computational systems; in
the current context, the goal of such algorithms should be to produce referring expres-
sions that human hearers will understand, rather than referring expressions that human
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speakers would utter” (Dale & Reiter, 1995, p. 253). The ambiguity of their goal also
shines through when they write: “The fact (for example) that human speakers include
redundant modifiers in referring expressions does not mean that natural language gen-
eration systems are also required to include such modifiers; there is nothing in principle
wrong with building generation systems that perform more optimizations of their output
than human speakers. On the other hand, if such beyond human-speaker optimizations
are computationally expensive and require complex algorithms, they may not be worth
performing; they are clearly unnecessary in some sense, after all, since human speakers
do not perform them” (Dale & Reiter, 1995, p. 253).
The ambiguities surrounding the aim of reg models raise significant problems for
evaluating such models. The goal of humanlikeness would call for comparison against
corpora or against the results of language production experiments (e.g., van Deemter et
al., to appear; Jordan & Walker, 2005; Viethen & Dale, 2007; Gatt & Belz, 2010; van
der Sluis & Krahmer, 2007). By contrast, the goal of producing expressions that are
easiest to understand (Paraboni et al., 2007) would tend to make reading (e.g., self-paced
reading or eye movements during reading; Garrod, Freudenthal, & Boyle, 1994; Almor,
2000; Gordon, Grosz, & Gilliom, 1993) or auditory language comprehension paradigms
(e.g., recording of eye movements while people identify objects in a visual scene; Sedivy,
Tanenhaus, Chambers, & Carlson, 1999; Brown-Schmidt, 2009) the evaluation methods
of choice.
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The psychological reality of computational algorithms
Even granted that reg algorithms do not seek to model the actual language pro-
duction process, but only its output, there are aspects to these algorithms that make
them psychologically implausible. Perhaps the most striking property of most compu-
tational algorithms that is problematic from a psycholinguistic point of view is their
determinism: they always generate the same referring expression in a particular situa-
tion or condition. For example, in a situation where there is no other object of the same
category as the target object (say, a single car), most algorithmic models either always
generate minimally specified expressions (the car) or always generate overspecified ex-
pressions (e.g., the red car). But given this specific situation, they would not generate a
minimally specified expression in some cases and an overspecified expression in others.
This contrasts with the results from experiments with human speakers, which show that
they produce various types of referring expressions in a specific condition. For example,
Pechmann (1989) showed that across different speakers, both minimally specified refer-
ring expressions (on 21% of experimental trials) and overspecified expressions (on 75%
of trials) were produced when there was no other object of the same category (e.g., only
a single car), while underspecified expressions were also chosen on a small percentage
(4%) of trials. Very similar non-deterministic results were observed by Engelhardt et
al. (2006), while Dale and Viethen (2010) showed that even when referring to simple
objects in simple scenes, different speakers used a large variety of referring expressions
to refer to the same object, while the same speaker was likely to vary their choice of
referring expression considerably in very similar (or even isomorphic) scenarios. Inter-
COMPUTATIONAL PSYCHOLINGUISTICS OF REFERENCE PRODUCTION 17
person variability is not a feature of (spoken or written) language alone: De Ruiter and
colleagues, for example, report a large amount of variation between subjects in terms of
the type and role of their gestures (de Ruiter, Bangerter, & Dings, 2012). Explanations
of inter-person variation are not difficult to think of. Variability may be partly explained
by children’s exposure to different stimuli – compare (D. Matthews, Butcher, Lieven, &
Tomasello, 2012), in this journal issue, for relevant experiments. Yet, theoretical models
struggle to give variation a natural place; at best, they offer a many-to-many relationship
between contents and forms allowing, in particular, that a given content can be expressed
through different forms. A good example is Gundel’s reformulated givenness hierarchy,
which specifically allows different types of referring expressions to be associated with
each level in the hierarchy (Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharski, 2012).
It is important to note that even probabilistic reg algorithms (such as the sys-
tems described and evaluated in Gatt & Belz, 2010) are usually deterministic. These
models typically use a probability distribution learned from training data to return the
most probable referring expression given a particular situation. However, their output
in isomorphic situations will always be the same. An exception is the model proposed
by Fabbrizio, Stent, and Bangalore (2008), who proposed a probabilistic model which
incorporates individual preferences for particular referring expressions, thereby altering
the type of expression it generates depending on the preferences of individual speakers.
Another non-deterministic model was proposed by Dale and Viethen (2010), who used
different algorithms to mimic different speakers and found that this increased the corre-
lation between the model and human responses as compared to a deterministic model.
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For a specific speaker, however, the output of both these models remains deterministic;
that is, it is assumed that a single speaker always produces the same referring expres-
sion in a particular situation. The results of experimental studies are normally reported
averaged across participants, so they do not report whether individual human speakers
are deterministic. However, closer examination of the data of individual participants
of almost any study reveals that their responses vary substantially, even within a single
experimental condition. For example, we examined the data of Fukumura and van Gom-
pel (2010), who conducted experiments that investigated the choice between a pronoun
and a name for referring to a previously mentioned discourse entity. The clear majority
(79%) of participants in their two main experiments behaved non-deterministically, that
is, they produced more than one type of referring expression (i.e., both a pronoun and
a name) in at least one of the conditions.
Indeed, variability in many aspects of individual behaviour seems to be the rule
rather than the exception. A classic example comes from ballistic research around 1900,
which observed that the bullets of a skilled target shooter do not always hit the target,
but pile up close to the bull’s eye, with fewer and fewer strikes further away from it, giving
rise to a bell-shaped probability distribution (Holden & Van Orden, 2009). Linguists
have long known that language use is variable as well. Sociolinguists, for example,
believe that language change and social register (e.g., idiolects associated with different
social strata) cause a phenomenon known as diglossia, where different grammars are
represented in the head of a single individual at the same time (Kroch, 2000). For each
utterance, the individual is thought to “choose” between different grammars, where the
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probability of choosing a given grammar is affected by the recent history of the individual.
The link with reference was made in (Gibbs & Van Orden, 2012), who discuss variability
in speakers’ pragmatic choices, including the choice how to refer (e.g., whether or not to
express privileged information, cf. (Horton & Keysar, 1996), proposing to explain these
by assuming that “the bases of any particular utterance (...) are contingencies, which
are to an underappreciated extent the products of indiosyncracy in history, disposition,
and situation” (Holden & Van Orden, 2009).
The idea that human responses may best be viewed as non-deterministic, even
within a single speaker, suggests that non-determinism should be an important property
of a psychologically realistic algorithm. One approach to model non-determinism is
exemplified by so-called roulette-wheel generation models (Belz, 2007). Rather than
always generating the same, most probable output given a specific input, these models
sample alternatives from a non-uniform distribution, returning outputs in proportion to
their likelihood. To our knowledge, models of this kind have not yet been exploited for
generating referring expressions; however, this may be a promising way to incorporate
non-determinism. Another possibility would be to turn current deterministic algorithms
for the generation of referring expressions into non-deterministic algorithms. Regardless
of which approach is chosen, the goal should be to make quantitative, and testable,
predictions.
Consider the Incremental Algorithm (ia) once again (Dale & Reiter, 1995). The
original, deterministic version always generates the cup to refer to a black cup in the
presence of a blue ashtray and yellow candle. The reason is that it assumes a fixed
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preference order, causing it to check the category of the object (cup) before its colour
(red), and since cup rules out both distractors, colour is not tried. As we have seen,
research by Pechmann (1989) suggests that speakers do produce overspecified expressions
such as the red cup in this situation. To account for this, the ia could be revised
slightly, so that colour is selected first when it is a discriminating feature. But this
would still not fully account for Pechmann’s (1989) results, because he showed that
although overspecified expressions (e.g., the black cup) are produced most frequently,
minimally specified expressions are produced on one quarter of the trials. To account
for this, the ia would need to incorporate some form of non-determinism. One possibility
would be to include a random process by which the algorithm checks colour before type
three-quarters of the time and type before colour in the remaining quarter (both across
speakers and within a single speaker).
If we assume that the decision about which property is checked first is a proba-
bilistic, non-deterministic process, then the algorithm makes interesting predictions that
are relevant to psycholinguists. For example, a non-deterministic version of the Incre-
mental Algorithm makes exact, quantitative predictions about when overspecification
occurs. Although several psycholinguistic studies have shown that overspecification is
common, it remains unclear under exactly what conditions it occurs and psycholinguistic
models do not make clear predictions concerning this issue. We therefore believe that
the algorithm provides an important step towards a better understanding of the possible
psychological mechanisms involved in overspecification.
To let us make this more concrete, assume that when referring to a small black cup
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in the context of a large white cup and a large red cup (so colour or size can be used to
uniquely characterize the target), speakers produce the black cup four times more often
than the small cup. In that case, there is a 80-20% colour-size preference (ignoring,
for the sake of argument, possible overspecified expressions like the small black cup).
According to the non-deterministic version of the Incremental Algorithm this pattern
arises because speakers first check colour in 80% of cases, whereas they first check size
in 20% of cases (and the category cup is obligatorily added, because the black one or the
small one sounds awkward). Once we have determined the colour-over-size preference,
we can predict how often overspecification occurs in other situations. When referring to
a small black cup in the context of a large white cup and a large black cup (i.e., only
size is required to produce a distinguishing description), the algorithm initially chooses
colour over size in 80% of cases, but because this does not uniquely identify the target, it
subsequently adds size, resulting in an overspecified expression (the small black cup) in
80% of cases. In the other 20%, it first checks size, and because this uniquely identifies
the target, colour will not be added. An 80-20% split is also predicted to occur when the
same target (a small black cup) occurs in a context with a small white cup and a large
white cup (so colour is required). In 80% of cases, colour is checked first, and because this
uniquely identifies the target, the algorithm produces the black cup. In the other 20%,
size is selected first, but because it does not uniquely identify the target, colour is added,
resulting in the small black cup. Thus, the algorithm makes clear quantitative predictions
that arise from the fact that colour is usually checked before size. These predictions can
be tested in psycholinguistic studies (Gatt, Gompel, Krahmer, & Deemter, 2011).
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Insert Table 2 about here.
Other algorithms can be made nondeterministic in similar ways. For example,
the Greedy Algorithm (Dale, 1989) iteratively selects the property which rules out most
distractors from among those that have not yet been ruled out by the properties selected
so far. But ties can occur, where two or more properties rule out the same number of
distractors, and in this case the choice could be made probabilistic. When referring to
a small black cup in the context of a large white cup and large red cup, for example,
the revised greedy algorithm might produce the black cup 80% of the time and the small
cup 20% of the time (assuming, as before, that the category – cup – is always added
given that omission of the category sounds awkward). One interesting prediction is that
the same 80-20% colour-over-size preference should occur when referring to e1 in Table
2 even though a priori the colour of the target rules out more distractors (e2 and e3)
than its size (e2). The reason is that the Greedy Algorithm first selects the property
with spoon, because this rules out most distractors (e3, e4, and e5). Next, only the
distractor e2 remains, which can be removed by either colour or size, resulting in a tie.
Assuming an 80-20% colour-over-size preference, people should produce the black cup
with the spoon in 80% of cases and the small cup with the spoon in 20% of cases. We
believe this is a striking new prediction, especially if colour is always chosen over size
when it rules out more distractors. If this prediction were to be confirmed, this would
provide initial support for the idea that human speakers first select the property that
rules out most distractors.
Existing metrics of ‘humanlikeness’ (Gupta & Stent, 2005; Jordan & Walker, 2005;
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Viethen & Dale, 2007; van Deemter et al., to appear) were not designed to measure the
extent to which an algorithm reflects the variation in a corpus. This is most easily seen
in connection with variation between speakers. Consider a simple example involving
just one reference task, to which just two speakers are exposed: speaker a utters np1
and speaker b utters np2. Suppose these two nps are as different as they can be, so it’s
impossible to match (i.e., resemble) both of them. Now consider two algorithms, each
of which is run twice. One algorithm generates the two human-produced nps, while the
other behaves deterministically, generating np1 on both runs:
Speaker a: np1. Speaker b: np2.
Algorithm 1: np1 (first run); np2 (second run)
Algorithm 2: np1 (first run); np1 (second run).
Intuitively speaking, Algorithm 1 captures the variation among the two speakers much
better than Algorithm 2. Existing evaluation metrics, however, attribute the same score
to both algorithms, because these metrics compute to extent to which the descriptions
generated by a given algorithm match the speaker-generated descriptions on average,
comparing each generated description with each human-produced description. Since
both of the descriptions, np1 and np2, match one human-generated description fully
(leading to a score of 1) while failing to match the other one entirely (scoring 0), both
algorithms end up with the same averaged score of 0.5. The development and deployment
of metrics that are able to measure the variation among speakers (or, indeed, within a
speaker) is an example of the way in which computational research will need to change
if a more psycholinguistic angle on language production is adopted.
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Although it is the ultimate aim of reg to produce referring noun phrases, most
current reg algorithms are limited to content determination: they determine which
properties are expressed, but they seldom determine how and in which order they are
realised, leaving the decision between, for example, the big red car and the red big car to
a generic and independent realisation algorithm (pace Siddharthan & Copestake, 2004;
Khan et al., 2012). But if algorithms are to offer full models of reference, they will need
to address linguistic realisation in its full generality. Psycholinguists have long suggested
that incrementality plays an important role here as well. Pechmann (1989), for example,
observed that participants often realised colour before they realised size, even though
this is not the preferred word order, and argued that this is because colour is recognised
faster than size, because colour is not a relative property. Recently, this idea has received
support from a study by Brown-Schmidt and Tanenhaus (2006), who showed that the
timing of speakers’ fixations to a distractor (e.g., a large triangle) predicted whether they
produced a prenominal adjective (the small triangle) or a repair following the noun (the
triangle . . . the small one). Furthermore, fixations to the distractor were made earlier
when speakers produced a prenominal adjective than a postnominal modifying phrase
(the triangle with the small squares in the context of a triangle with large squares). This
supports the idea that information that is first fixated and accessed is encoded first in the
referring expression. Future algorithms could incorporate these findings, for example by
making sure that highly salient properties that are rapidly encoded are realised earlier
in referring expressions than less salient properties.
Finally, as was already pointed out by Dale and Reiter (1995), some algorithms are
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unlikely to be psychologically realistic, because they are computationally very costly to
run when there is a large number of distractors. Under such conditions, which are quite
typical of real-life situations, such algorithms would thus be very slow. Given the limited
processing capacity of humans and their reliance on “fast and frugal” heuristics rather
than exact calculations (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982;
Simon, 1956), it seems likely that human processing mechanisms use clever shortcuts
that will need to be incorporated into future algorithms.
Concluding remarks
Psycholinguists and computational linguists who study reference production ap-
proach their work with different questions, mentalities, and dispositions. Psycholinguists
are driven by a wish to understand how human language production works, whereas
computational linguists are at least partially motivated by a wish to contribute to prac-
tical applications. Consequently, psycholinguists are interested in the human production
process, while computational linguists tend to focus on the product – the process is irrel-
evant as long as it can be implemented to run fast enough. Conversely, the algorithms
constructed by computational linguists require a level of detail that seems foreign to
psycholinguistic models of reference production, which focus on high-level issues such as
audience design and alignment.
It appears to us, however, that the differences between the two disciplines are
becoming increasingly irrelevant. For, on the one hand, computational linguists are
increasingly making use of experimental-statistical research methods. On the other
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hand, there is a growing awareness that psycholinguistic models would become more
interesting and more useful if they gained in algorithmic detail. The papers in the
present issue of the journal Topics in Cognitive Science illustrate both these trends.
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entity type colour size
e1 dog black large
e2 dog white small
e3 dog black small
Table 1: An example domain
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entity type colour size spoon
e1 cup black small with
e2 cup white large with
e3 cup white small without
e4 cup black small without
e5 cup black small without
Table 2: Another referential domain
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1: Pref ← the preference order
2: Desc ← the description
3: r ← the intended referent
4: Dist ← the distractors
5: while Pref is not exhausted do
6: a← the next attribute
7: v ← the value of r for a
8: if v excludes some distractors then
9: Add v to Desc
10: Remove the distractors from Dist
11: end if





The ia uses a preference order to model
attribute salience, for example type >
colour > size in Table 1. To identify an
intended referent r (say e1), the algorithm
traverses the preference order (lines 5–12),
checking at each stage checks whether r’s
value on a given attribute excludes some
distractors. Thus, for e1, type is tied first,
but is not selected (all entities are dogs).
Subsequently, colour is found to exclude
e2 and size excludes e3.
The result is {black, large}, which is
overspecified. Dale and Reiter (1995) also
proposed a function to add type in case
it is omitted by the search. Thus, this
description could be realised as the large
black dog.
(b) An example
Figure 1. : The Incremental Algorithm
